



The present day medical center bears little resemblance to
the hospitals of the early part of this century when they were
thought of merely in terms of providing facilities where patients
could meet professional people with a view to undergoing surgery
or receiving general nursing care. Advances in medical science
have made it necessary for the physicians to call upon the hos-
pital for an increasing variety of services, some of which involve
exceedingly complex procedures requiring highly specialized skills.
In response to this demand, the hospitals have evolved certain
organizational patterns which function in such a manner as to
make needed skills and services available to the patient in an
efficient program of patient care. As a result, the modem hospitals
have greatly increased in both size and efficiency, and an unfor-
tunate consequence of this has been the decreased opportunity
for the old-fashioned personal human relationship between physi-
cian and patient. This relationship still remains the most im-
portant ingredient of medical practice. Frequently, actions against
a doctor or hospital have their origin in some fancied personal
slight or some appearance of neglect, often based on nothing more
than a lack of courtesy or consideration on the part of members
of the hospital staff. When the physician-patient relationship is
good, there is far less likelihood of misunderstandings and much
less chance of medical people becoming involved in actions for
negligence.
Medical malpractice lawsuits are increasing at an alarming
rate in both England and the United States. Malpractice insur-
ance fails to eliminate the punitive effects of an adverse judgment
since it cannot protect the doctor against the inevitable damage
to his professional standing in the community. In fact, all physi-
cians are injured to some degree by every publicized malpractice
claim.
During the past twenty years, the public has become increas-
ingly aware of the possibilities of financial gain which may accrue
to them if by chance some harm has resulted from their medcial
or surgical treatment. Many malpractice claims rest on no better
foundation than some disappointment in the outcome of therapy
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and the hope that somehow the mishap may be turned into a
profit. Most of the claims for negligence arise out of treatment
in hospitals where the patients' needs are served by an endless
variety of domestic, technical, paramedical, general, and specialized
medical personnel, sometimes acting individually and sometimes
as members of a highly integrated team.
With improvements in the technique and advances in the
knowledge of modern anesthesia, development of the heart pump,
and the use of other resuscitative measures, operations can now be
attempted where formerly no attempt was feasible. Many of these
new operations are inherently dangerous in themselves and often
involve methods which present their own special risks. Their
complexity has greatly increased the opportunities for error by
the surgeon or anesthesiologist. In attempting such operations
as replacing damaged and inefficient heart valves, which threaten
the life of the patient; closure or repair of cardiac defects in babies
and young children; or transplanting healthy kidneys in patients
dying of renal failure, doctors have added many useful years to
their lives. Must they also support some of them financially for
all those added years of survival? Certainly any threat to the
integrity of these hospitals and dedicated medical people is a
matter of grave public concern.
It is so easy to be wise after the event and to condemn as negli-
gence that which was only a misadventure. We ought always
to be on guard against it, especially in cases against hospitals and
doctors. Medical science has conferred great benefits on mankind,
but these benefits are attended by considerable risks. . . . We
cannot take the benefits without taking the risks. Every advance
in technique is also attended by risks. Doctors, like the rest of
us, have to learn by experience; and experience often teaches in
a hard way. Something goes wrong and shows up a weakness, and
then it is put right. That is just what happened here. Dr. Graham
sought to escape the danger of infection by disinfecting the am-
poule. In escaping that known danger he unfortunately ran into
another danger. He did not know that there could be undetect-
able cracks, but it was not negligent for him not to know it at that
time. We must not look at the 1947 accident with 1954 spec-
tacles .... 1
Indeed, it was the extraordinary accident to these two men which
first disclosed the danger. Nowadays, it would be negligent not
to realize the danger, but it was not then.
One final word. These two men have suffered such terrible
consequences that there is a natural feeling that they should be
compensated. But we should be doing a disservice to the com-
munity at large if we were to impose liability on hospitals and
doctors for everything that happens to go wrong. Doctors would
1 Roe v. Minister of Health, [1954] 2 Q.B. 66, 83 (C.A.).
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be led to think more of their own safety than of the good of their
patients. Initiative would be stifled and confidence shaken. A
proper sense of proportion requires us to have regard to the con-
ditions in which hospitals and doctors have to work. We must
insist on due care for the patient at every point, but we must not
condemn as negligence that which is only a misadventure.2
There is some apprehension on the part of the medical profes-
sion, not without support in recent cases, that the courts are
requiring a higher standard of due care than formerly. The courts
in England, as well as in some American jurisdictions, have refused
to continue the "community" test widely applied throughout most
of the United States. This test prevented the application of a uni-
form standard of due care and afforded relief to the rural practioner
at a time when inadequate means of transportation and communi-
cation prevented him from keeping abreast of scientific progress.3
There is little doubt that the quality of actual care has improved
as a result of scientific advances and newly acquired knowledge.
Apparently there is a tendency to increase the duration of
vulnerability of the medical profession to the threat of legal action.
For example, the statute of limitation for medical malpractice in
the state of Ohio is one year.4 If, however, the negligent act was
the proximate cause of the death of the patient, the two-year
limitation of the wrongful death statute 5 comes into operation.'
The action is brought by the personal representative of the de-
cedent for the pecuniary loss resulting from his death. Though
based on malpractice, it is a separate cause of action from that
which the injured party would have had if he had survived.
Just three months after the decision, the Ohio Supreme Court,
in a split decision, held that a husband's suit for medical expenses
incurred and for loss of consortium and services of his wife, who
was injured through medical negligence, was not one for mal-
practice and therefore not governed by the one-year statute of
limitations. 7 The court said that the injury was to the rights of
the plaintiff and was not one arising on contract or enumerated in
the Revised Code and therefore fell within section 2305.09 (D), 8
2 Id. at 86.
3 See Tvedt v. Haugen, 70 N.D. 338, 294 N.W. 183 (1940); Sinz v. Owens, 33
Cal. 2d 749, 205 P.2d 3 (1949). See generally McCoid, "The Care Required of
Medical Practitioners," 12 Vand. L. Rev. 549 (1959).
4 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2305.11 (Page 1954).
5 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2125.02 (Page 1954).
6 See Klema v. St. Elizabeth's Hosp. of Youngstown, 170 Ohio St. 519, 166
N.E.2d 765 (1960).
7 Corpman v. Boyer, 171 Ohio St. 233, 169 N.E.2d 14 (1960).
8 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2305.09 (D) (Page Supp. 1963).
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which prescribes a four-year statute of limitations. This allows the
plaintiff two years in addition to the Ohio general negligence
statute in which to institute suit. The dissent argued that the
cause of action is enumerated in other parts of the statute, and
also, since the plaintiff must prove medical negligence to prevail, his
case is one for malpractice.
The elasticity inherent in the one-year Ohio statute of limita-
tions is readily demonstrated by a review of the cases in this and
other states. In interpreting the legislative intent, the Ohio
courts have held that the statute of limitations begins to run from
the time when the physician-patient relationship has been ter-
minated.' In California, Florida, Louisiana, Pennsylvania, Texas,
and New Jersey, under statutes like the Ohio's, courts have held
that the statute of limitations does not run until the discovery of
the injury or until plaintiff should have discovered the injury.
Judge Gibson, in the concurring opinion in the Lundberg case,10
urges that it is unrealistic to say that the plaintiff had a cause of
action all along even though he was unaware of it." He suggests
that there is no sound reasoning behind the present Ohio rule that
the statute of limitations begins to run upon the termination of
the physician-patient relationship and he favors the more equitable
rule which would date the running of the statute from the time
of discovery of the injury or from such time as the plaintiff, in the
exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered the injury.
Other statute-of-limitations problems are involved in deter-
mining the class of persons to whom the one-year malpractice
statute of limitations was intended to apply. Most courts have
not distinguished between nurses and physicians in cases of medical
malpractice. However, an early New York case 12 applied the
three-year general negligence statute when a nurse was alleged to
have been negligent, rather than the two-year statute of limitations
for malpractice, on the ground that nursing was not the practice
of medicine. In a suit against a hospital, the court held that the
statute of limitations for malpractice was unavailable as a defense
because a hospital could not lawfully practice medicine and there-
9 See, e.g., DeLong v. Campbell, 157 Ohio St. 22, 104 N.E.2d 177 (1952);
Bowers v. Santee, 99 Ohio St. 361, 124 N.E. 238 (1919) ; Gillette v. Tucker, 67 Ohio
St. 106, 65 N.E. 865 (1902).
10 Lundberg v. Bay View Hosp., 175 Ohio St. 133, 191 N.E.2d 821 (1963).
11 Contra, Shearin v. Lloyd, 246 N.C. 363, 98 S.E2d 508 (1957). This court,
in a "missing sponge" case, held that the statute of limitations began to run at the
time that the negligent act occurred.
12 Isenstein v. Malcomson, 227 App. Div. 66, 236 N.Y. Supp. 641 (1929).
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fore could not be liable for malpractice, but only for negligence.1 3
In 1962, however, in Flynn v. New York Hosp.,4 the court assumed
that the defense would be available to the hospital.
Another facet of the statute of limitations problem is presented
in the Lundberg decision.", In this case a patient sued the hos-
pital, alleging that the negligence of its physician-pathologist, a
salaried employee, in making a careless and faulty diagnosis of
cancer in a biopsy specimen, caused her to undergo unnecessary
surgery which incapacitated her. The pathology reports were
made under the name of the hospital, and the patient was billed
for these services by the hospital in April, 1955. Major surgery
was performed on April 29, 1955, and the patient was discharged
from the hospital on May 6, 1955. She continued to return to the
hospital for routine check-ups until February 18, 1956. Suit was
filed on February 16, 1957, almost two years after the pathology
report was made. There was no evidence to show that she had
any contact with the physician-pathologist after April, 1955,
although apparently other members of the hospital's osteopathic
staff continued to follow her progress for almost another year. The
court said that the relationship continued until terminated with re-
spect to the medical service "undertaken by the hospital" for the
particular condition of the patient. The court went on to say:
The present action is essentially one for the recovery of damages
for bodily injury due to negligence, and Section 2305.10, Revised
Code, places a limitation of two years on the bringing of such
an action. Thus, whether the action is treated as one for mal-
practice or as one for ordinary negligence, it was timely brought
in either instance.16
This decision raises some very troublesome problems, some of
which are illuminated in the concurring opinion of Judge Gibson:
I concur in the judgment on the basis that the hospital, a cor-
poration, may not lawfully engage in the practice of medicine or
osteopathy.. .. [I] ndividuals only may be licensed to engage in
the practice of medicine or osteopathy.... It is to be presumed,
in the absence of a claim and evidence to the contrary, that this
hospital was not unlawfully practicing medicine or osteopathy.
Hence, notwithstanding the fact that the cause has been treated
by the parties and the lower courts as one in malpractice, the
action, having been commenced . . . within two years after the
13 Roewekamp v. New York Post Graduate Medical School & Hosp., 254 App.
Div. 265, 4 N.Y.S.2d 751 (1938).
14 33 Misc. 2d 393, 224 N.Y.S2d 881 (1962). See also Davis v. Eubanks, 83
Ohio L. Abs. 28, 167 N.E.2d 386 (1960).
15 Lundberg v. Bay View Hosp., note 10 supra.
16 Id. at 136, 191 N.E.2d at 823.
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negligent reading of the biopsy slide .... is not barred by Sec-
tion 2305.10, Revised Code.
In my opinion, it is unnecessary for the court to discuss the statute
of limitations regarding malpractice.17
Thus the negligence is treated as a corporate defect, and apparently
the plaintiff need have no regard as to whether it is the physician-
pathologist, the pharmacist, the nurse, or a member of the lay staff
who is negligent, if this view is to be followed in the future.
However, the majority opinion discusses a new concept, the
hospital-patient relationship, and approves the notion of "medical
service undertaken by the hospital." 's Can this be fairly interpreted
as a de facto recognition of the corporate practice of medicine? The
nature of a hospital-patient relationship is not at all clear. Judge
Gibson goes on to say: "[T]here is no justification for extending
the doctrine of DeLong v. Campbell . . . beyond the relationship
of physician and patient to the relationship of hospital and
patient." 10
It would seem that the hospital is within the class intended
to be protected by the legislature in enacting a statute of limita-
tions for malpractice actions. It is certainly a valid defense when
asserted by the physician who is primarily negligent.20 Should it
not also be available to the hospital who is only secondarily negli-
gent by virtue of being the employer of the tortfeasor?
REs IPSA LOQUITUR
There is no place in the field of medical malpractice for the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. In the Roe case, Lord Justice Morris
said of it: "[T]his convenient and succinct formula possesses no
magic qualities: nor has it any added virtue, other than that of
brevity, merely because it is expressed in Latin." 21 But he was
wrong, for it does possess magic qualities. Originating in the inci-
dent of the falling barrel and apparently incompletely understood,
each appearance of that doctrine in the courts has resulted in some
alteration of the original concept so that by 1964, it has emerged
as an instrument of social justice and not as a rule of law. Res ipsa
loquitur means "the thing speaks for itself." But what does it say?
17 Id. at 136, 191 N.E2d at 824.
Is Id. at 135, 191 N.E2d at 823.
10 Id. at 137, 191 N.E2d at 824.
20 See Klema v. St. Elizabeth's Hosp. of Youngstown, mipra note 6, at 521, 166
N.E2d at 767, where Judge Bell stated: "Had plaintiff's decedent survived the
post-operative period and brought suit himself against the negligent doctor, no serious
contention could be made that any other than the one-year statute of limitations
would have applied."
21 Roe v. Minister of Health, [1954] 2 Q.B. 66, 87 (C.A.).
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In some of the most recent cases it seems to be saying that courts
are applying a new legal basis for therapeutic misadventure: i.e.,
liability without fault. Res ipsa loquitur has been described as a
common sense appraisal of the probative value of circumstantial
evidence." 22 The difficulty in relying on common sense, however,
is that it is so uncommonly found.
The first requirement for the application of the doctrine is
that the accident be of a sort that does not ordinarily occur unless
someone is negligent. As to this element of the triad, one court
has said that res ipsa loquitur is applicable in malpractice cases:
only ...where a layman is able to say as a matter of common
knowledge and experience that the consequences of professional
treatment were not such as ordinarily would have followed if due
care had been exercised.23
Here a child had died while undergoing a tonsillectomy under gen-
eral anesthesia. Whereas a tonsillectomy may be considered
minor surgery, the administration of a general anesthetic is always
a major procedure, attended by considerable risk. The possibility
of a fatal outcome is always present even though the greatest pos-
sible degree of skill and care be used. Anesthesia for tonsillectomy
is much more hazardous than that given for many other procedures,
for the operative field is within the patient's airway. That a lay-
man could conclude that an anesthetic death does not occur in the
absence of negligence is sheer nonsense.
As Judge Traynor correctly pointed out in his dissent:
[B]y approving the instruction, the court in effect holds that
solely because an accident is rare it was more probably than not
caused by negligence. There is a fatal hiatus in such reasoning.
The fact that an accident is rare establishes only that the pos-
sible causes seldom occur. It sheds no light on the question of
which of the possible causes is the more probable when an acci-
dent does happen.24
The second prerequisite to invoking the doctrine is that the
accident be caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive con-
trol of the defendant. Even in the most obvious "missing sponge"
cases, which meet the first requirement of res ipsa loquitur, there is
no such thing as the instrumentality being within the exclusive
control of the defendant. A minimum of three persons, and more
22 Frost v. Des Moines Still College of Osteopathy & Surgery, 248 Iowa 294,
301, 79 N.W.2d 306, 311 (1957).
23 Cavero v. Franklin Gen. Benevolent Soc'y, 36 Cal. 2d 301, 309, 223 P2d 471,
476 (1950).
24 Id. at 314, 223 P.2d at 479.
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commonly a team of four or five, share the control of the instru-
mentality. In Ybarra v. Spangard2 5 where there were multiple
defendants, this troublesome requirement was promptly changed,
and "exclusive control" of "the" defendant was no longer a sine
qua non.
The third requirement presents little difficulty. It is the fa-
miliar rule that the plaintiff must not have been contributorily
negligent.
Res ipsa loquitur has been said to give rise to an inference of
negligence which would require the defendant to come forward
with evidence to explain how a particular accident could have hap-
pened even though due care was exercised. If this were done, the
inference would disappear, and the burden would be on the plain-
tiff to present evidence showing that the defendant was negligent.
This also is apparently no longer true. Courts sometimes ignore
the basic rule that the evidence must sustain the inference of negli-
gence against a particular defendant. In the case of Cho v. Kemp-
ler 2 the California court, in spite of the fact that there was no
proof of malpractice and in spite of the fact that the defendant gave
an adequate explanation of the mishap, permitted the jury to con-
sider the case on the theory of res ipsa loquitur. This procedure
has been criticized by Professor Jaffe of the Harvard Law School:
[I]f the defendant's explanation is not to be accepted, the doctrine
of res ipsa should not be applied at all. It is something of a mock-
ery to require the defendant in the name of fairness to offer an
explanation and then let a jury ignore the explanation on no other
basis than its choice not to believe.2 7
The Chto case was concerned with a facial paralysis following
severance of the seventh nerve during a radical mastoidectomy.
The medical testimony showed that this was a rare complication of
such an operation but that it can occur in the absence of negligence.
Cases based on the scame medical facts have been decided in
Tennessee 2 and in Maryland.29 In both, the courts correctly re-
jected the application of res ipsa loquitur, since the injuries could
have occurred regardless of the care used. In 1962, a California
court properly rejected the doctrine in a case of dehiscence following
an operation for resection of the sigmoid colon.8 0 The court rea-
lized that it was not a matter of common knowledge that a de-
25 93 Cal. App. 2d 43, 154 P.2d 687 (1944).
26 177 Cal. App. 2d 342, 2 Cal. Reptr. 167 (1960).
27 Jaffe, "Res Ipsa Loquitur," 1 Buffalo L. Rev. 1, 11 (1951).
28 Calhoun v. Fraser, 23 Tenn. App. 54, 126 S.W2d 381 (1938).
20 Bettigole v. Diener, 210 Md. 537, 124 A2d 265 (1956).
30 Jamison v. Debenham, 203 Cal. App. 2d 744, 21 Cal. Reptr. 848 (1962).
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hiscence will not occur unless there is negligence, or that a scultetus
binder would prevent its occurrence, and therefore, failure to put
on such a binder does not make res ipsa loquitur applicable.
Whether this case heralds a reversal in the trend in California must
await future developments. The improper use of res ipsa loquitur
in medical malpractice cases is sometimes explained as a response
of the courts to the relative inability of the plaintiff to determine
what happened while he was undergoing medical, and especially
surgical, treatment and his inability to obtain expert witnesses to
help him establish the requisite proof of negligence in the court
room.
The first basis advanced as justification of this practice is
completely without merit. Under the modern rules of civil proce-
dure, by means of deposition and other discovery procedures, all
of the medical and hospital records, as well as the explanation of
the involved parties, are available to the plaintiff. For instance, the
patient's medical chart has included within it the operating room
sheet containing the names of all the operating room personnel and
the capacity in which they served the needs of -the patient; the
number and type of sponges used during the surgery and the
signature of the nurse responsible for making a correct sponge
count; and description of the operation as dictated by the surgeon,
including all pertinent steps of the procedure, as well as an
infinite amount of other medical data observed and accurately
recorded by the hospital staff, are included therein.
There is some merit in the contention that doctors are reluc-
tant to testify in court. Doctors are busy people, and they regard
with serious concern every request to make a courtroom appear-
ance on behalf of clients, whether in the everyday variety of per-
sonal injury claims or in the comparatively rare malpractice cases.
As expert witnesses they go to court prepared to render an opinion
on subjects within their expertise. All too frequently, they are never
permitted to express their "expert opinion." Modern trial tactics
make it imperative for opposing counsel to permit them to say or
imply just enough to influence the jury in drawing a particular
inference. Then, on cross examination, the doctor is frequently
made to feel as if he were the defendant in a major criminal trial
and not, as he hoped, an expert witness performing a civic duty
by assisting the court to reach a just decision. A doctor under-
standably does not relish the prospect of facing opposing counsel's
efforts to descredit him as person before the jury. Despite this
natural reluctance to function other than as a physician, many
physicians are willing to testify in a meritorious cause. Evidence
of this is seen in the joint medico-legal plan for screening medical
[Vol. 25
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malpractice cases established by the Joint Medico-Legal Commit-
tee of the New Mexico Medical Society and the New Mexico State
Bar Association.
A final comment on the doctrine of res ipsa might well focus
on the notion that it results in "a common sense appraisal of the
probative value of circumstantial evidence." 31 This vague ap-
proach would make everything depend upon whether an ordinary
person would deem as negligent a given act. Such common sense
tests "have a way of collapsing in marginal cases and of leading
to a maze of casuistry without much principle." 32 Two similar
1953 cases illustrate this point. Plaintiffs in Kansas 83 and North
Carolina 3 4 brought suits for damages for X-ray burns suffered
while undergoing X-ray therapy for the removal of warts. The
Kansas court accepted the argument that res ipsa loquitur was
applicable because the defendant had examined plaintiff's wart,
advised its removal, assumed the duty of removing it in a proper
manner, and had exclusive control of the X-ray equipment, and
yet plaintiff had suffered severe burns.3 5 The North Carolina court,
however, ruled that the doctrine was inapplicable, as the X-ray
burns could have occurred even if proper care had been exercised.3'
It is arguable that the results in these two cases are inconsistent,
and it would seem that such an inconsistency vitiates the notion
of a "common sense appraisal" of circumstantial evidence, at least
in regard to the problems involved in medical malpractice suits.
In a recent case, the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed a lower
court ruling which permitted a nurse acting in her professional
capacity to be found negligent without requiring expert testimony
at the trial.3 7 The majority held that:
The court may take judicial notice that juries of today include
women. Many of these woman jurors are mothers and, in many
instances, grandmothers. In the case at bar, there were six women.
They know probably as much if not more about childbirth than
many experts who might be put on the witness stand.38
31 Frost v. Des Moines Still College of Osteopathy and Surgery, note 22 supra.
32 Kahn-Freund, "Servants And Independent Contractors," 14 Modem L. Rev.
504, 507 (1951).
33 Emrie v. Tice, 174 Kan. 739, 258 P.2d 332 (1953).
34 Nance v. Hitch, 238 N.C. 1, 76 S.E2d 461 (1953).
35 See supra note 33, at 745, 258 P.2d at 338.
36 See supra note 34, at 13, 76 S.E.2d at 469.
37 Jones v. Hawkes Hosp. of Mt. Carmel, 175 Ohio St. 503, 196 N.E.2d 592
(1964).
38 Id. at 507, 196 N.E2d at 595.
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These profound observations were aptly answered by Judge
Duffey in a well-reasoned dissenting opinion:
I fail to see how the majority opinion is strengthened by the fact
that some jurors are women (apparently as opposed to men),
some of whom the majority assumes to be mothers and whom the
majority further assumes to know more about childbirth than
"many experts." This case involves the conduct of a nurse and
not childbirth. It is true that the appellant here (as any plaintiff
in a malpractice action) had difficulty producing evidence, both
because of the lack of witnesses at the crucial point in this case as
well as the professional aspects of the action. However, the diffi-
culty of obtaining evidence is not a substitute for a lack of
evidence.
The type of case has, and should have, bearing on how strictly
the evidence is viewed. Malpractice has been traditionally distinct
from other negligence actions. The distinction lies not just in
analytical differences but in recognizing the human factor that
patients and jurors tend to expect too much. We tend to fail
to distinguish a professional's mistake in judgment from unrea-
sonable judgment. Anticipating excellence, we condemn in hind-
sight anything short of perfection. Failure becomes proof of
incompetence. The law of malpractice has partially controlled this
by a stricter application of the rules of evidence and by emphasis
in instructions. There are many who believe that these controls
have been eroded in recent years-that with the advance in
medicine the judiciary too is now demanding perfection.3"
HOSPITAL LIABILITY
On no part of the community has the impact of the Welfare
State been so striking as on the hospitals and on medical practice
generally. On the hospitals more than on general practice because,
from being voluntary organizations maintained in part by chari-
table contributions, in part by fees paid by patients, and in very
great part by honorary service given by generations of surgeons
and physicians, the hospitals are now quite changed.
. . . No longer are medical services given in public hospitals as
a charitable act. Staffs, whether professional or otherwise, are
paid; and the hospitals are, by right, free to all who seek treat-
ment there.
This change in the constitution and management of hospitals has
been marked by changes in the law not only in regard to the
way in which the hospitals are maintained and governed and
controlled, but in regard to the implications that may arise from
allegations of negligence arising from treatment in such insti-
tutions.40
39 Id. at 511, 196 N.E.2d at 598.
40 Lynch, "The Hospital, The Public, And The Law," 30 N.Z.LJ. 118 (1954).
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In a series of cases, beginning in 1942 with the case of Gold v.
Essex County Council,4 hospital liability has been continually
expanded. At that time, hospitals were liable only for negligent
"administrative" acts of their employees, but the court soon aban-
doned the administrative-medical distinction and held that a
hospital was liable for the negligent acts of a nurse unless she
was found to be the "borrowed servant" of the physician. Collins v.
Hertfordshire County Council42 carried the trend still further.
The hospital was held liable for the negligence of a resident
physician who prepared a solution of one per cent cocaine instead
of one per cent procaine in response to a telephone order. Finally,
the case of Cassidy v. Ministry of Health 43 is considered by many
authorities to be the leading case in establishing the modern theory
of hospital liability. Here, the hospital was held liable for the
negligent acts of its employees, whether nurses or doctors. The
limitations of vicarious liability of the hospital were considered
to coincide with those of the contract of employment.
Kahn-Freund suggested that his decision was based on a trans-
formation of the traditional "right to control" test into something
like the "subordination" test or "organizational" test operative in
France and Germany. He maintained that the control test had to
be transformed if it was to remain a working rule and not a mere
verbal incantation.4
4
The tremendous scientific, technical, and economic develop-
ments which are a concomitant of our era have wrought changes
in the relationship of master and servant and employer and em-
ployee. Respondeat superior has commonly been applied through-
out industry, even though the employer was totally ignorant of
the scientific details or technical methods which must be employed
in doing some of the more complicated tasks. To say that such an
employer "controls" the performance is unrealistic. Such employees
are hired precisely because they have the specialized knowledge,
skill, and judgment that these jobs require. The employer retains
ultimate control by virtue of his power of dismissal. This applies
just as well to the physician-employee as it does to the technician.
Subordination to the employer's managerial power is made the
test.4G
41 [1942] 2 K.B. 293 (C.A.).
42 [1947] K.B. 598.
43 [1951] 2 K.B. 343 (C.A.).
44 See Kahn-Freund, "Servants And Independent Contractors," 14 Modern L.
Rev. 504.
45 See Mersey Docks & Harbour Bd. v. Coggins & Griffiths (Liverpool) Ltd.,
[1947] A.C. 1.
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Integration into the employer's organization is the essential
ingredient. Doctors and nurses are considered to be a part of the
organization of the hospital for implementing the treatment of the
patient. This emphasis on the hospital's organizational responsi-
bility was clearly reflected in Jones v. Manchester Corp.,46 in which
a newly qualified doctor was required by the hospital rules to
administer anesthetics in the hospital's emergency room. Mr.
Justice Oliver said:
I think to put a weapon like a barbituric within reach of a girl
who has only been qualified for five months and expect her to
handle it accurately, with sufficient knowledge and experience-
to watch the way a patient has to be watched-is simply asking
for trouble.47
Although both the doctor and the hospital were held to be primarily
negligent, a more serious view was taken of the hospital's failure
to so run its organization that such a mistake would not occur.
In the Roe case, Lord Justice Denning, who wrote a concur-
ring opinion, would have expanded a hospital's liability for its staff
still further:
[Tjhe hospital authorities are responsible for the whole of their
staff, not only for the nurses and doctors, but also for the anaes-
thetists and the surgeons. It does not matter whether they are
permanent or temporary, resident or visiting, whole-time or part-
time. The hospital authorities are responsible for all of them.
The reason is because, even if they are not servants, they are the
agents of the hospital to give treatment. The only exception is
the case of consultants or anaesthetists selected and employed by
the patient himself.48
Hospital liability is founded at present on its relationship to
the negligent person. However, it could be founded on the obliga-
tion taken by the hospital toward the patient, and Lord Justice
Denning apparently favors this view. He has made the hospital
analogous to a common carrier and applied the principle that when
a person is under a liability to use care, he cannot relieve himself
of such liability by employing an independent contractor. This
imposition of a "personal" duty would, of course, provide an even
wider basis of liability than either the "control" or "organizational"
tests, but it would also put an impossible burden upon the hospital's
staff. It would most certainly adversely affect the quality of medi-
46 [1952] 2 Q.B. 852 (C.A.).
47 Id. at 854.
48 Roe v. Minister of Health, [1954] 2 Q.B. 66, 82 (C.A.).
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cal care, since no one knows better than the doctor that he cannot
guarantee a good result.
The trend toward a wider basis of hospital liability is also
readily observable in the United States. The trend has not been
uniform, and a great deal of variety is to be found when viewed
on a state-by-state basis. In some jurisdictions, hospitals are
immune from lawsuits. In others, they are liable only if negligent
in the selection of employees. Other states impose partial tort
liability for paying patients but not for charity patients. In some
jurisdictions, liability is determined on the nature of the negligent
act performed, with the hospitals liable for ministerial or adminis-
trative acts but not for medical or professional acts requiring medi-
cal judgment and skill. On the other hand, some hospitals are
considered to function as a governmental adjunct and claim immu-
nity from suit on the theory of sovereign immunity.
With these many variations in mind, one might briefly consider
some of the landmark cases which appear to punctuate the trend
toward full liability for the hospital's staff. In President . Directors
of Georgetowin College v. Hughes,4 9 Judge Rutledge pointed out
the inequitable basis of hospital immunity when the patient's re-
lationship to the hospital was the determinative factor:
Abolition of the immunity as to the paying patient is justified
as the last short step but one to extinction. Retention for the
nonpaying patient is the least defensible and most unfortunate
of the distinction's refinements. He, least of all, is able to bear
the burden. More than all others, he has no choice. He is the
last person the donor would wish to go without indemnity. With
everyone else protected, the additional burden of protecting him
cannot break the trust. He should be the first to have reparation,
not last and least among those who receive it.5°
For many years the New York courts attempted to differ-
entiate hospital liability on the basis of the nature of the act
performed. If the act was considered administrative, the hospital
was liable, whereas if it was medical or professional in nature, the
hospital was not liable. These administrative-professional distinc-
tions were evidence of a judicial policy of compromise between
the normal application of respondeat superior and total immunity
for charitable institutions. Hospital liability was gradually ex-
tended by a liberal interpretation of what constitutes an adminis-
trative task, and finally in 1957, the New York courts ruled that
the hospital can be sued for the negligence of their employees acting
49 130 F2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
Go Id. at 827.
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within the scope of their employment.5 There the courts over-
turned an old judge-made rule which had become unworkable:
The conception that the hospital does not undertake to treat the
patient, does not undertake to act through its doctors and nurses,
but undertakes instead simply to procure them to act upon their
own responsibility, no longer reflects the fact. Present-day hos-
pitals, as their manner of operation plainly demonstrates, do far
more than furnish facilities for treatment. They regularly em-
ploy on a salary basis a large staff of physicians, nurses and
internes, as well as administrative and manual workers, and they
charge patients for medical care and treatment, collecting for such
services, if necessary, by legal action. Certainly the person who
avails himself of "hospital facilities" expects that the hospital will
attempt to cure him, not that its nurses or other employees will
act on their own responsibility.52
And further:
The rule of non-liability is out of tune with the life about us, at
variance with modern day needs and with concepts of justice
and fair dealing.53
There is discernible a trend toward complete abolition of hos-
pital immunity, and in recent years judicial decisions have reflected
this at an accelerating place.54 When the allegedly negligent act is
said to have been performed by a nurse, the courts generally discuss
"right of control" in determining the applicability of respondeat
superior. The trend appears to be toward rejection of the "borrowed
servant" doctrine and holding liable the general employer, the
hospital, except in certain special circumstances." In most cases
the torts of nurses and internes, in whom much less discretion is
permitted, are more likely to be imputed to the hospital than those
of the physicians, who possess greater skill. However, the status of
the physician will ordinarily be determined by the facts of each
case rather than his being arbitrarily classified solely on the basis
of his profession. Considering the traditional "right of control" test,
an increasing number of states, including California, Minnesota,
Mississippi, New York, Ohio, Tennessee, and Wisconsin, have
51 See Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3 (1957).
52 Id. at 666, 143 N.E.2d at 8.
53 Id at 667, 143 N.E.2d at 9.
54 See, e.g., Avellone v. St. John's Hosp., 165 Ohio St. 467, 135 N.E.2d 410
(1956).
55 See, e.g., Rural Educational Ass'n v. Bush, 42 Tenn. App. 34, 298 S.W2d 761
(1957). In this "missing sponge" case, the court stated that it was the nurse's duty
to count the sponges as a part of the hospital's service and required no special or pro-
fessional skill or judgment of the surgeon.
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partially or completely repudiated the view that a doctor can never
be a servant. Physicians in residency training programs, although
permitted by hospital rules and regulations to exercise a much
greater degree of discretion than the newly qualified intern, have
have often been found to be subject to the "right of control" of
the hospital."6
The fully qualified physician or surgeon is usually, but not
always, considered to be an independent contractor. In recent
years, an increasing number of physicians have accepted salaried
positions on hospital staffs, and some courts have considered them
to be employees whose torts may be imputed to the hospital. How-
ever, the opinions are not always clear as to the basis upon
which liability is founded. In the Lundberg case,57 involving the
negligence of a salaried physician-pathologist, the court found that
he was an agent of the hospital by estoppel. "[T]he hospital by
its conduct . . . induced the belief that [Dr.] Haws was in its
employ as part of its regular establishment, whereby it was estopped
to successfully claim otherwise." "' In this case the patient was
billed by the hospital for services rendered, and the pathology
report was made under the heading of the hospital. These indicia
of agency were found sufficient to hold the hospital liable under
the doctrine of respondeat superior. Yet it is questionable that the
requirements for invoking the doctrine of estoppel are present
in this case. Where a principal by words or conduct causes another
to believe in the existence of certain circumstances, and causes him
to act in reliance upon that belief so as to change his previous
position, he will be estopped to aver differently. Here the patient
did not rely on the representations made by the hospital. These
indicia of agency were unknown to her at the time the decision to
perform the hysterectomy was made. Patients are not permitted
to read the medical chart, and the patient would not have been
billed until her discharge from the hospital the following month.
In Seneris v. Haas,59 the physician-anesthesiologist, alleged to
have been negligent in the administration of a spinal anesthetic,
testified that he was an independent contractor who billed his
patients directly on a fee-for-services basis. Yet it was held that he
was an agent of the hospital, although the court was somewhat
obscure as to the legal basis for liability. The traditional concept
of "right to control" was not discussed. The court noted with
approval the following argument: "'An agency is ostensible when
56 See, e.g., Moeller v. Hauser, 237 Minn. 368, 54 N.W2d 639 (1952).
U Lundberg v. Bayview Hosp., note 10 mtpra.
US Id. at 136, 191 N.E.2d at 823.
59 45 Cal. 2d 811, 291 P2d 915 (1955).
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the principal intentionally, or by want of ordinary care, causes a
third person to believe to be his agent who is not really employed
by him.'" 60
Again the key factor is apparently some kind of public repre-
sentation. And yet the indicia of agency are exceedingly weak and
involve factors which in the ordinary course of events are not made
known to patients. For instance, consider that the anesthesiologist
enjoyed staff privileges at only one hospital; that the drugs and
equipment he used were supplied by the hospital; that he made
himself available for emergency cases on certain regular nights
and weekends; and that he was assigned to his case by the oper-
ating room supervisor who was an employee of the hospital. These
reflect nothing more than some of the privileges and duties of
staff membership, yet the court held that this was sufficient to
establish a prima facie case of agency since there was nothing in
the record to show that the plaintiff should have been on notice
that the anesthesiologist was not an employee of the hospital.
This is a strange conclusion in view of the fact that only a small
minority of physicians are salaried employees of hospitals. A more
reasonable view would be to consider the more probable relation-
ship (independent contractor) to be the fact. The hospital did
not bill the patient for his services, and in view of the common
knowledge that physicians frequently refer their patients to other
doctors for special services, a more reasonable inference would have
been that her surgeon had requested the services of the anesthesi-
ologist and that he, like her surgeon, was an independent contractor.
There may be some social justification for the outcome of this
case, but there is surely little basis in precedent.
Another troublesome aspect pervading these cases is that
courts have repeatedly stated that the corporate practice of medi-
cine is illegal. Such of these decisions as involve hospitals have
generally been rendered with respect to the sciences of radiology
and pathology. In malpractice cases, however, a close scrutiny of
the relationship between the hospital and its medical staff is
necessary in order to determine the applicability of the doctrine
of respondeat superior. If the tortfeasor is found to be an inde-
pendent contractor and the hospital to be immune from liability,
the statement is frequently made that a hospital is a corporation
and cannot practice medicine. 1 If, on the other hand, the physi-
0 Id. at 831, 291 P.2d at 927.
61 See, e.g., Moon v. Mercy Hosp., 150 Colo., 430, 433, 373 P2d 944, 945 (1962):
"That a hospital employs doctors on its staff does not make it liable for the discharge
of their professional duty since it is powerless, under the law, to command or forbid
any act by them in the practice of their profession." However, hospitals do make
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cian, intern, or resident is found to be a salaried employee, liability
is imputed, presumably on the basis of "right to control," giving
rise to an inference that the hospital is legally required to furnish
medical services.62
The reconciliation of professional freedom with organizational
control, though troublesome at times, presents basically no differ-
ent problems from the employment of professional personnel in
any large organization, public or private, which is managed by
laymen. . . .All the more reason is there, when the parties are
in agreement and the patient is well served, that the law should not
intervene to disrupt a satisfactory relationship. 63
Apparently some courts are struggling to do just that. In
Lundberg, the court speaks of the "hospital-patient" relationship
with respect to the running of the statute of limitations, while
categorically stating that no claim has been made nor evidence
presented to charge that the hospital is engaged in the corporate
practice of medicine. Such inconsistencies should be resolved be-
fore the theory of a "hospital-patient" relationship is made the
basis of decision.
The future course of the legal remedies available for injuries in-
duced by medical malpractice remains unsettled, but certain aspects
of the problems involved should be objectively weighed. The patient
has a right to expect that his doctor will use his best medical judg-
ment when caring for him, uninfluenced by adverse judgments. The
client has a right to be fairly compensated when he has been
negligently injured. However, courts would do well to consider
that intimidated physicians cannot do work of the quality expected
of them, and outrageously large judgments cannot help but en-
courage others to try their luck, particularly when the investment
in a lawsuit on a contingent-fee basis is so small.
rules and regulations regarding medical care to which the doctor must adhere if he
wishes to maintain staff privileges.
02 See, e.g., Hollant v. North Shore Hosp., Inc., 24 Misc. 2d 892, 206 N.Y.S.2d
177 (1960). The court argued that if a resident staff doctor, in compliance with an
order of an independent surgeon, should place the patient in jeopardy, the hospital
would be liable, provided that in following the order, the resident was within the
course of his employment with the hospital.
63 Willcox, Hospitals And The Corporate Practice Of Medicine 3 (1957).
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